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Against these lines of argument one frequently
encounters a certain objection. It is argued that since
the animals for fighting, hunting and racing exist only
because they have been bred for such human uses,
human beings are justified in so treating them. The
purpose of this paper is to evaluate this line of objection,
or to speak more precisely, to evaluate the two distinct
objections implicit in this line. For the objection may
be either that
(l) the present uses of the animals are justified
because they are better for the animals than the
alternative, namely non-existence, or that

Standardly, philosophical arguments about the
quality of treatment human beings owe nonhuman
animals! rest on two bases. Peter Singer is famous
for arguing from the capacity of animals to feel pain
to the conclusion that since almost none of the pain
human beings cause animals is necessary, almost none
of it is morally justifiable (Singer, 1989, pp. 78-79).
Singer rests his case on the premise that who suffers
pain does not affect the badness of the suffering, so
that, without strong justification, the infliction of pain
is universally wrong (Ibid., pp. 77-78). Tom Regan is
equally famous for his argument that the beliefs and
desires which normal one year-old mammals clearly
have give those animals rights to life and humane
treatment (Regan, 1983, pp. 81, 84-86; also, Chapter 9,
esp. p. 351). Human beings who regularly thwart
animal desires merely for their own pleasure clearly
violate those rights. It will be a simple corollary of
Singer's and Regan's arguments that most uses of
animals in sports are wrong. Pain is intrinsic to the
life of animals raised for fighting each other; death is
an intended statistical regularity in hunting and
trapping; and most animals bred for racing are killed
at the conclusion of their racing days.
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(2) breeding an animal for a purpose gives the
breeders (transferable) rights over what they
have bred.
I shall pursue these alternatives sequentially.
The Value of Existence
The strength ofthe first form of the objection rests on
a common intuition comparing the values of existence
and non-existence. It is frequently urged that an existence
which includes many chronic miseries is better than nonexistence (McMahan, 1981, pp. 126-127; and Kavka,
1981, pp. 109-122). The fact that most persons facing

PHILOSOPHY
132

Summer 1991

Existence, Breeding, and Rights: The Use ofAnimals in Sports

such miseries do not commit suicide is often cited as
corroborating evidence for this intuition.
For two reasons, however, this intuition seems a
problematic basis for the objection. First, some persons
facing such miseries do commit suicide. And indeed
one characteristic of miseries which lead many persons
to suicide is the persons' conviction that their situation
will not improve (Brandt, 1980, pp. 121-122). This is
true not only of the psychological miseries which lead
to many traditional suicides but also of disease
dehabilitations. Persons in the final stages of Lou
Gehrig's disease, e.g., are much more likely to commit
suicide than are diseased persons whose prognosis is
more favorable in any terms: the control of pain, the
retention of faculties or the prospect of recovery. It is
thus not obvious that a life of unattenuated misery is
better than non-existence.
But this dialectic line reaches no clear conclusion,
one way or the other, inasmuch as the lives of animals
used in fighting, hunting and racing are typically not
lives of unattenuated misery. I therefore press ahead to
the second line of response to arguing that since the
lives of these animals are (arguably) worth living despite
what misery human beings inflict, human beings are
entitled to treat these animals, within that limit, as they
please, since they would not exist at all save for human
beings bringing about their existence.
This second line of response does not challenge the
premise that the lives of animals used in sport are better
than non-existence. Rather it challenges the inference
from this premise to the conclusion that, so long as the
premise remains true, humans may treat animals as they
please. Suppose that a human being who had neglected,
harmed or abused another human were to offer this
defense: however miserable I may have made the life
of this fellow creature, (s)he was clearly left with a life
better than death. Obviously this defense, which could
be offered for almost every crime except homicide and
the most brutal and irreversible of maimings, fails. One's
behavior is not acceptable merely because it leaves
others with a life better than death.
Thus pro-animal lines of reasoning are not defeated
by the objection that human uses of animals in sport are
acceptable since a certain kind of life lived by animals is
better than non-existence. Even if (and when) the premise
is maintainable, the conclusion does not follow.
Some, however, will think that the line of
reasoning is stronger than my statement of it. For
people will note this difference between animals used
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in sports and human victims of crime: at least to a
large extent, the animals owe their existence to the
human beings who bred them for human sporting
purposes. But people are not bred for the criminal
purposes of other humans.

The Rights of the Breeder
I therefore turn to the second objection, that
breeding an animal for a purpose gives the breeders
(transferable) rights over what they have bred. The
argument in support of this second objection is
analogical. If an artificer creates an artifact from
materials (s)he owns, the artificer becomes the owner
of the newly-created artifact. The artifact, being
property, has no rights of its own. Rather, the owner
can use it as (s)he pleases, subject only to limitations
owing to the possible infringement of the rights of
other human beings (Mill, p. 111). And as artifacts
are the products of artifice, so animals used in sport
are the products of breeding. As artifacts are property,
so bred animals are property. As artifacts are made
for the purpose of the artificer, so animals used in sport
are bred for the purposes of the breeders, which are to
have the animals used in the usual sporting ways. And
rights over both will be similarly transferable.
Clearly, the central question about this analogical
objection to pro-animal views is the strength of the
analogy on which itrests. Before directly examining that
strength, however, I note the extension the objection
appears to have. Obviously, the analogy applies, as
intended, to animals bred for sporting uses. It also applies
to animals bred for traditional factory farming. For
instance, the resistance ofheifers and chickens to the close
quarters of factory farms creates an undesirable cost for
factory farmers which breeders have worked to eliminate.
The argument, however, has other extensions which
might be less sanguine:

(I) Where some might object to the analogy
between making artifacts and breeding animals
on the grounds that traditional breeding does not
involve the degree of material alteration of
traditional artifact making, genetic engineering
clearly reduces that gap. For example, one
extension of the analogy is to the projected
salmon farms of Peuget Sound. The salmon
projected for this farming will be genetically
engineered. Beyond the terms of traditional
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animal husbandry, these fish will be bred for
quick growth by the insertion of non-salmon
genes into their genetic material (MacKenzie,
1989, p. 54). Thus it is unclear that the degree
of material alteration will continue to mark a
clear distinction between traditional artifact
making and the breeding of animals.

Here we reach an important conclusion, which
I shall first state as follows: If a group of human
beings is enslaved and bred, the breeding of
the slaves does not give the breeders rights over
the offspring.
The importance of this conclusion, however, is
not really about slavery, as we can see from the
following: imagine that slavery is illegal in the
strong sense that persons do not have the right
to make themselves the slaves of another. Even
in those circumstances, it is possible that one
party will convince two other parties to
reproduce. Or, more simply, two parties may
convince themselves that they should reproduce.
We may also imagine that the parties who do
the convincing also take pains to control which
sperm and ovum unite. Such a taking of pains
will, I suppose, make the pain taker(s) the
breeder(s) of the resulting infant. 2

(2) A second extension of the analogy is to animals
in national parks, which are not often bred. Yet,
from an evolutionary viewpoint, neither are the
parks the preserves they are popularly thought
to be. The animals live to a significant extent in
the presence of tourists and other humans.
Animals who have initiated aggression against
human beings have been killed. By their
elimination, the gene pool is selected for nonaggression against humans. Similarly, whenever
contact with human beings or the managed
environment of the park affects the reproductive
success of individuals, that effect is functionally
equivalent to breeding. Certainly the national
parks are full of animals amenable to picture
taking by humans.

But no matter how carefully a union of human
sperm and ovum is controlled, the implication
will not follow that since the offspring would
not exist save for the breeding, therefore the
breeder has strong rights of control over the
offspring. Granted, there have been eras in
which parental rights have been de facto strong
over children (even grown children with children
of their own). Yet the argument we would make
is that the growing capacities of a child to
manage its own life make the continued,
undiminishing authority of the parent over the
child unjustifiable.

(3) Perhaps most disturbing is the import of the
analogy for a recent controversy. Recall the
suggestion that the imputed superiority of
America's black athletes derives from the
selective breeding of slaves (Wiggins, 1989, pp.
180-185). For the sake of discussion, let us
postulate that the control of slave-owners over
the reproductive success of slaves has produced
a present population in which variously
athletically valuable traits are especially
prominent. Even if this is granted, clearly the
application of the analogy yields an untoward
result. Contrary to any egalitarian conception
of human rights, contrary to any principle of antislavery, the application of the analogy is that

The Use of Animals in Sport
Having explored this analogical argument from
breeding and the objection to it, based on the imagined
breeding of humans, I return to the issue of this paper,
the use of animals in sport. Should we accept the
analogical argument from artificers to animal breeders
or, contrarily, should we accept the objection from the
human case to the conclusion that breeders do not have
the rights of artificers?
To answer this question, I propose to consider what
organisms are like. For animals used in sport are
organisms, whereas the artifacts which the artificer
analogy brings to mind are not organisms.3 Thus the

1. the breeders have rights over what they have
bred, in such a way that
2. what they have bred is indeed their property,
with the further implication that
3. as the breeder of the mare has rights over
the foal, so the breeder of the slave has
rights over the child (and the child's child)
of the slave.
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analogy of artificers to breeders requires a strong
analogy between artifacts and organisms. The other
reason for thinking that we should consider what
organisms are like focuses on my argument that, even
if human beings were bred, their being bred would not
give their breeders rights over them. Any force of that
argument also rests on an analogy, an analogy between
any bred human beings and any animals bred for
sporting purposes. The analogy is at least that all such
bred creatures are organisms.
What then is an organism? We may at least say that
an organism is always an entity with parts, for it is the
way in which a thing's parts relate that make a thing an
organism. The parts (or organs, we might say) of an
organism interact in an interdependent way. That is,
the non-functioning of a given part would impair or
make impossible the functioning of the other parts, the
extreme result being the death of the organism.
Moreover, because the functioning of the parts of
organisms is interdependent, it is not at all surprising
that the parts of organisms react in coordinated, selfregulative ways, through sensing and response devices.
Indeed, recuperative powers of organisms harmed
through disease or injury exemplify this coordinative,
self-regulatory power in threatening environments.
Now if self-regulation is characteristic of organisms
in general, nevertheless organisms differ in the
mechanisms of self-regulation.4 Evolutionary biologists
note the possibility of predicting a species' genetic
endowment from the constancy of the organisms'
environment (in terms of food supply, possibilities for
reproduction, and lethal forces). The more constant an
organism's environment is, the more successful will be
a genetic endowment which hardwires sensory
capacities (for discriminating food, reproductive
opportunities, and danger) to response capacities.
Contrarily, if the organism's environment varies because
the food, the reproductive opportunities or the dangers
vary (perhaps in response to the organism), then
hardwired response capacities become disadvantageous. In other words, hardwired responses maximize
efficiency, but their effectiveness will be inversely
proportional to environmental variability.
Now if we think about the hardwiring of response
to sensory capacities, we may note that, for sexual
animals, eating, reproducing and avoiding dangers in
the environment all involve interaction with other
organisms. Moreover, these other organisms will have
at least diverse, if not contrary, desiderata. Therefore,
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evolution will tend to advantage those other
organisms who do not passively fit into the activities
of the other. Similarly, evolution will tend to favor
active organisms who can sense and respond to the
responses of others.
Internally to an animal, such adaptation means that
the wiring is not so full or not so fixed. Environmentally,
such adaptation means that the animal's behavior will
be a product of learning how to sense and respond in
nuanced ways. Accordingly, many of the successful
organisms in variable environments tum out to be
organisms that learn. And in species living in variable
environments and relying on learning, the young spend
a period of immaturity not only being nourished and
growing, but also learning. By developing a repertoire
of nuanced responses, the young become more suited
to living successfully within their environment, even
without the aid of progenitors.
Thus an organism is a whole whose parts interact in
interdependent ways through which the organism is
more able to succeed in its environment.s For many
birds and most mammals, successful interdependent
interaction of parts requires considerable learning.
Now various are the roles of such evolutionary
adaptation, when animals are used in sport. In hunting
the focus is confused. One emphasis is on a competition
between hunter and hunted, but the other emphasis is
on the bravado of success in the hunt. Here learning
plays many roles. (1) The hunted animals learn to sense
and avoid dangers. The hunters can in tum learn how
to make their presence hard to sense. Here we have a
classic evolutionary competition, a zero-sum game,
which, played over time, improves the skills of both
the hunted and the hunter (Dawkins, 1986,pp.180-181).
(2) But the human hunter need not merely compete.
The human hunter may set the terms of the competition.
The hunter chooses the weapons of the hunt. The hunter
decides whether to destroy the competition, e.g., by
blinding the deer with floodlights. The technology of
the hunter is thus ample to disdain the classic
evolutionary competition for the bravado of the
successful hunt. But evolutionarily this is simply a
hunter's trick, and the hunter is tricked. If I am equally
thrilled by the successful hunt no matter how I kill the
animal, so are my taste buds fooled by the sweetness
of saccharine to a gratification reenforced by the
nutritive value of fructose. The ability of the human
being to set the terms of its own pleasure is a doubleedged sword insofar as it allows us to divorce our
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pleasures from the evolutionary causes for their
gratifying us. 6
In animal fights, two problems arise. The environment of the fight is manipulated to guarantee a victor
and vanquished. And, either inside or outside of the
fight, death is the fate of the vanquished. This factor
mirrors the possible manipulation of the hunting
environment. The anthropocentric problem at this point
is with the desirability of promoting a certain human
vantage point and its correlative sentiment. For the
spectator may easily identify with the perspective of
the environment creator, a manipulative perspective
from which deaths of others can be controlled while
one remains an aloof, spectating non-participant.
The second problem arises because, as one controls
a lethal environment, one also controls an evolution.
The animals who survive such an environment are
genotypes bred for a vicious competition. Again I sense
an anthropocentric problem: what place should we give
to the human sentiments stirred by the model of
viciousness the fighting animals present?
In racing, the focus is on a non-fatal competition
among animals. Activities of rooting and practices of
betting extend the competition, vicariously, to human
beings. Compulsive gamblers aside, human beings,
through racing, create environments in which to
experience the thrills of competition without its dangers.
This creation of an environment, however, does not, to
my knowledge, impinge on the racing animals in the
way the flood lights trap the buck, nor in the way the
fighting selects animals for their viciousness. Rather,
the difficulties about racing occur when, through injury
or age, a racing animal is no longer competitive. The
analogy of bred animals to artifacts is that a useless
artifact may be destroyed.
Can we, then, accept this analogy? Does a thing's
being an artifact imply the sovereignty of the artificer
over the artifact? or does a thing's being an organism
imply the rights of the thing against it progenitor? The
argument from the bred human infant is that what the
human being becomes as it matures makes it unjustifiable
to exercise an artificer's rights over it. This argument
focuses the issue of older racing animals on the fact that,
although animals are legally the property of their owners,
unlike other properties, these animals mature not only by
growing but also by learning. Their genetic stock is
adapted for environments in which their behaving as they
have learned will benefit them. In this regard they are
like human beings, not like typical artifacts.
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Clearly, the use of animals in sports raises a number
of anthropocentric issues about the desirability of
promoting certain traits and values among human
beings. Having surveyed these anthropocentric issues,
I return to my central question of whether bred animals
are justifiably treated as artifacts. Here the ethical
terrain is tricky.
Traditional anti-factory farm arguments, which
emphasize either the pain or the frustrations and
anxieties animals experience under actual conditions,
seem to play into the hands of agriculturalists who, for
reasons of cost and profit, would aim to breed farm
animals so as not to experience pain, frustration or
anxiety. That is, for the agriculturalist, a farm animal
is valuable insofar as it is a source of protein. The more
efficiently that protein can be developed, the better for
the farmer. Bones and sinews, aggression against each
other and the biochemical accompaniments of manifest
anxiety are all agricultural costs the farmer would be
pleased to eliminate for the right price. Thus, the proanimal advocate must be prepared to face the response
that any objection to causing animals pain or frustration
can be rendered moot without changing either factory
farming practice or consumer dietary habits: one can
simply breed the capacities to feel pain and frustration
out of our favorite growing blobs of protein.
Now my point is that the argument I have mustered
against the analogy between breeders and artificers
rests on the disanalogy between the learning capacities
of bred animals which traditional artifacts do not share.
But a food animal which had the capacities for pain,
frustration and anxiety bred out of it might well lack
the learning capacities which seem to differentiate
the appropriate treatment of bred animals and
traditional artifacts.
When we use animals in sport, however, our interest
is not in the efficient creation of consumable protein.
Animals typically need learning capacities in order to
perform optimally in the sport. In other words, optimal
animal performance relies on a disanalogy between bred
animals and artifacts? at just the point which compromises
the argument that animal breeders have rights over what
they have bred comparable to the rights of artificers over
their artifacts. The learning capacities ofanimals, which
are so vital to their involvement in human sports, are the
very basis for the conclusion that the ethical strictures
appropriate to any bred human children, which arise from
their capacities for learning and increasing self-direction,
apply to animals used in sports.
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Notes

McMahan, Jefferson. "Problems of Population Theory,"
Ethics, 92 (1981).

1 From this point on, when I refer to animals, I mean
nonhuman animals.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1926). Original work published 1859.

2 In England, for example, in vitro fertilization is available
to prospective parents only if they meet a large array of
conditions. Thus the resulting infants are (extensionally) bred
for in whatever ways that array of conditions correlates with
genetic traits.

Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983).
Scherer, Donald. "A Disentropic Ethic," The Monist, 1988.

3 Once I provide a defmition of an organism (below), it
will be clear that being an organism does not imply whether
an entity is materially made up of genetic material.
Accordingly, it is on my definition a contingent question
whether a human could create an artifact that was an organism
(regardless of whether it was composed of genetic material).

Singer,· Peter. "All animals are equal," In Tom Regan and
Peter Singer (eds.),Animal Rights and Hunum Obligations
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1989).
Wiggins, David K. "Great Speed But Little Stamina: The
Historical Debate Over Black Athletic Superiority,"
Journal ofSport History, 16 (2), 1989.

4 My defmition of organism correctly leaves open what
kind of organizational relationship exists between sensory and
(re)active capacities of the organism in the light of which the
coordinated self-regulative action occurs and the recuperative
powers operate.

5 I do not advertise this statement as a full definition of
an organism. Rather, I hold that an organism is fundamentally
an entity such that the interdependent interaction of its parts
maintains a disentropic state (Scherer, 1988). That fimdamental
point, however, seems unnecessary to the argument here.
6 Cf. J. Baird Callicott, (1980, 311-38) for the seminal
discussion of the evolutionary evaluation of pleasure and pain.
7 And a corresponding analogy between bred animals and
my imagined bred humans.
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